Would Superluminal Influences Violate the Principle of Relativity? by Peacock, Kent A.
Kent A. Peacock
Would
Superluminal
influenceS
Violate the 
principle 
of relatiVity?
Vol 1 N°1 2014
SOCIÉTÉ DE PHILOSOPHIE DES SCIENCES (SPS)
École normale supérieure
45, rue d’Ulm
75005 Paris
www.sps-philoscience.org
Vol. 1
N° 1   2014
49
Sommaire
                 
Would Superluminal influenceS 
Violate the principle of
relatiVity?
Kent A. Peacock
1 – Alleged troubles with 
superluminal effects and in-
fluences
There are at least two good reasons to take seriously the 
possibility of superluminal influences. First, they are arguably 
though controversially implicated in the violations of locality 
found in quantum mechanics.1 Second, it is not at all clear 
whether special relativity as it is usually formulated actually 
excludes superluminal influences or simply fails to describe 
them properly.2 To some knowledgeable observers these two 
claims will seem obvious, to others they will seem to be ‘not 
even wrong.’ I will not attempt a detailed explication or advo-
cacy of them in this paper, although it will become clear where 
my sympathies lie. The major purpose of this note is two-fold. 
First, it will attend to a job of undergrowth clearance, which 
is to defend the notion of superluminality against certain too-
common misconceptions which stem from misunderstan-
It continues to be alleged that superluminal influences of any sort would 
be inconsistent with special relativity for the following three reasons: 
(i) they would imply the existence of a ‘distinguished’ frame; (ii) they 
would allow the detection of absolute motion; and (iii) they would vio-
late the relativity of simultaneity. This paper shows that the first two 
objections rest upon very elementary misunderstandings of Minkowski 
geometry and on lingering Newtonian intuitions about instantaneity. 
The third objection has a basis, but rather than invalidating the notion 
of faster-than-light influences it points the way to more general 
conceptions of simultaneity that could allow for quantum nonlocality 
in a natural way.
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guished frame
3 – Superluminal influences 
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absolute motion
4 – Superluminal influences 
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tein’s relativity of
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native concepts of simul-
taneity
6 – Are ‘causal’ accounts 
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1 - See, e. g., Maudlin (2002) for a defence of this view.
2 - In support of the latter possibility I can only cite the large but admittedly inconclusive body of literature exploring the possibility of tachyons, superluminal 
frames, and extended relativity. It is not possible to do a comprehensive review of this literature here. The modern era of tachyon theory began in the 1960s, and 
papers from that era by G. Feinberg (1967) and O.-M. Bilaniuk and E. C. G. Sudarshan (1969) are widely cited; see also Bilaniuk, Deshpande, and Sudarshan 
(1962). E. Recami insightfully advocated the significance of tachyons in several publications; see his (1986) for comprehensive review. A neglected paper by R. 
I. Sutherland and J. R. Shepanski (1986) is an important milestone: their approach is different than the orthodox treatment of tachyons given by most authors. 
The orthodox approach is to substitute the condition v > c into the usual Lorentz transformations; this gives an imaginary Lorentz factor  leading to 
many difficulties of interpretation. Sutherland and Shepanski show that by re-deriving Lorentz-like transformations for the superluminal case (rather than merely 
substituting the condition v > c into the subluminal transformations) one arrives at a Lorentz factor  which makes all proper quantities real-valued 
for superluminal frames. M. Fayngold’s recent review monograph (2002) on superluminal physics is very useful, but it does not take account of Sutherland and 
Shepanski’s important innovation.  Very recently, J. M. Hill and B. J. Cox (2012), and R. S. Vieira (2012) have developed ‘extended’ versions of special relativity 
that use the same real-valued Lorentz factor as Sutherland and Shepanski’s for v > c. These approaches merit further study and development. 
Key words: superluminal influences, principle of relativity, tachyons, quantum nonlocality, 
simultaneity, state reduction
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dings of Minkowski geometry and from lingering Newtonian 
intuitions about simultaneity. Second, it will sketch a notion 
of simultaneity which (properly developed) could allow for 
quantum mechanical superluminal influences in a natural 
way. This paper is propaedeutic to a larger project being un-
dertaken by this author that is aimed at defining generalized 
conceptions of simultaneity which would be adequate to the 
fact that we live in a quantum universe.
Some of the misunderstandings I will criticize here were dealt 
with rather clearly by Frank Arntzenius (1990) over twenty 
years ago. However, they continue to appear in the professio-
nal literature, and so it seems necessary to respond to them 
yet again. Let’s begin with Barry Dainton, since the particular 
problems he cites will be useful talking-points for my discus-
sion. Dainton, in his Time and Space (2010), begins by quo-
ting J. R. Lucas (1990, pp. 9-10), who said,
if some superluminal velocity of transmission of causal influence 
were discovered, we should be able to distinguish frames of re-
ference, and say which were at rest absolutely and which were 
moving.
Dainton (p. 339) agrees, saying,
[a]nd in this he [Lucas] is surely right.  Were we to discover that a 
truly instantaneous connection exists between objects at different 
places in space, then assuming the connection has some detec-
table effects, not only would the notion of absolute simultaneity 
have a real application, but we would have a way of determining 
which frames of reference are at absolute rest and which are not: 
it is only with respect to frames truly [sic] at rest that the rela-
tive changes would occur at precisely the same time. [Emphasis 
added.]
Adán Cabello, a distinguished researcher in quantum infor-
mation theory, has worries about instantaneity similar to 
Dainton’s.  In Nature Cabello reviewed recent findings on 
quantum-mechanical correlations, and expressed his objec-
tion to instantaneous influences in quantum mechanics as 
follows:
... the decision of what test is performed in one location cannot 
influence the outcome of the test performed in the other loca-
tion, unless there is an instantaneous influence of the two tests 
on each other.  ... But this is too high a price to pay, because it 
is impossible to fit instantaneous influences into any theory in 
which such influences travel at a finite speed [emphasis added] 
(2011, p. 456).
Views like these have been held by other notable authors. 
Wesley Salmon, for instance, argued that
[a]rbitrarily fast signals yield absolute simultaneity of the 
strongest sort; the presence of the relativity of simultaneity in 
special relativity hinges crucially upon the existence of a finite 
upper speed limit on the propagation of causal processes and 
signals (1980, p. 122).
Nicholas Maxwell (1985, p. 38) seems to suggest that the 
mere existence of a superluminal effect would conflict with 
the Principle of Relativity.  He cites his own interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, which postulates the superluminal col-
lapse of spatially extended ‘propensitons’ which, he argues, 
would explain quantum correlations. Maxwell insists that his 
own theory 
irreparably contradicts special relativity.  For special relativity 
asserts that all inertial reference frames are physically equi-
valent.  In only one reference frame, however, will any given 
probabilistic collapse of propensiton state be instantaneous; in 
other, relatively moving frames the collapse will not, according to 
special relativity, be instantaneous (though always faster-than-
light). 
From these remarks we can tease out four closely-rela-
ted charges against superluminality.  Before stating them, 
though, it will be helpful to settle on terminology:
• A superluminal effect will be any physical process that 
involves the faster-than-light propagation of a geome-
tric locus such as the intersection point between a beam 
of light and a background, without presuming that 
this involves the transmission of any sort of influence 
or information faster than light.  A widely-discussed 
example is the searchlight-beam effect (Rothman 1960; 
Weinstein 2006): a beam of light from a rotating point 
source will track across a distant screen faster than 
light if the screen is at a sufficient distance.  Another 
example of a superluminal effect would be a string of 
flashbulbs or firecrackers set to go off simultaneously 
in a given inertial frame. In all other inertial frames the 
sequence of flashes or detonations will propagate su-
perluminally; we’ll return to the spacetime kinematics 
of such processes shortly. It is usually taken that there 
is no question of the searchlight beam effect or strings 
of firecrackers transmitting influences superluminally 
along their trajectories but it should not be assumed 
that the searchlight beam effect is unproblematic.3
Would Superluminal
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3 - Rothman (1960) dismisses the possibility that the searchlight beam effect could transmit information along the trajectory of the intersection point, but 
Weinstein’s wording (2006) is more cautious, suggesting that the problem needs more investigation. H. Ardavan (1984a) considered a scenario in which a rotating 
beam of electromagnetic radiation (such as that from a pulsar) traces a superluminal locus over a conductive surface (such as a layer of plasma spread through the 
solar system).  The beam of radiation will cause charge separation in the plasma and thereby induce electromagnetic radiation from the surface at the intersection 
locus. Ardavan carried out a rigorous calculation showing that if the locus orbits superluminally in a circular pattern then the induced field will diverge.  Ardavan 
further showed (1984b) that the gravitational field induced by the searchlight beam effect in such scenarios will also diverge. Ardavan left it open whether these 
results indicate the high-field breakdown of classical electromagnetic and gravitational field theory, or some sort of otherwise-implausible prohibition on the 
searchlight beam effect. The important questions raised by Ardavan’s work remain open.
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• A superluminal influence would be a hypothetical su-
perluminal process in which some sort of causation 
passes faster than light from one point to another dis-
tant point. I’d like to leave it as open as possible how 
superluminal influences, if any, would be constituted.
• A tachyon is a hypothetical faster-than-light particle, 
where we think of a particle as an entity that can be 
localized, at least under some circumstances. I’ll take 
a tachyon to be a form of superluminal influence, and I 
will sometimes use these terms interchangeably.4
• I will occasionally refer to superluminal influences, su-
perluminal effects, and tachyons collectively as forms 
of superluminal propagation when the difference 
between them doesn’t matter.
• Some papers in this literature (e.g., Sutherland and 
Shepanski (1986) and references therein) speak of 
superluminal reference frames, which would be hypo-
thetical faster-than-light Lorentzian physical systems 
which could be transformed to in some versions of su-
perluminal kinematics.
• I’ll also prefer the adjective ‘invariant’ (‘same in all 
frames of reference’) to ‘absolute’ or ‘truly’ because that 
is more in keeping with standard usage in current rela-
tivity literature, and because it avoids dubious philoso-
phical connotations.
Here are the Troubles with Superluminality with which we 
shall be concerned:
TS1:  There is no way to reconcile instantaneous influences 
with ‘any theory in which such influences travel at a finite 
speed’ (Cabello).
TS2:  The existence of a superluminal physical influence (such 
as Maxwell’s propensiton collapse) would imply the existence 
of a distinguished frame of reference and thereby violate the 
Principle of Relativity (Lucas, Dainton, Maxwell).
TS3:  If a superluminal influence could be used to 
transmit information controllably then it would be possible 
to detect absolute states of motion and again thereby violate 
the Principle of Relativity (Lucas, Dainton).
TS4:  If a superluminal influence were detectable or could 
be used to transmit information controllably, it would allow 
violations of the relativity of simultaneity (Dainton, Salmon).
I will show that TS1-3 rest upon elementary but surprisin-
gly widespread misconceptions about how superluminal 
motion would be represented in Minkowski geometry.  As to 
the fourth (and much more interesting) problem, I will have 
to respond guilty as charged, but I will argue (though not 
as conclusively as with TS1-3) that the charge is not nearly 
as damaging as most people suppose, and that it may in fact 
open a door to interesting new physics.
2 – Superluminal propagation 
does not imply a distinguished 
frame
Before we address the implications of the detectability of 
superluminal influences, let’s review some basics of super-
luminal kinematics in special relativity. Consider a familiar 
spacetime diagram, restricted to 2-dimensional (x,t) space 
for simplicity:
We’ll take the x and t axes to be the space and time axes res-
pectively of the ‘lab’ frame S and the x’ and t’ axes to be the 
space and time axes of another inertial frame S’ moving sub-
luminally to the right. We’ve chosen units such that the light 
cone is at 45˚ with respect to the x and t axes, and the line 
OE is the trajectory of something propagating with constant 
superluminal velocity to the right. Geometrically, what de-
fines any form of superluminal propagation is merely  that its 
spacetime trajectory is outside the light cone as shown. The 
line OE therefore need not be the worldline of an exotic hy-
pothetical particle, a collapsing propensiton, or the Starship 
Enterprise moving at warp speed; it could simply be a string 
of flashbulbs timed to go off simultaneously in some inertial 
frame. If the relative velocity of the moving (x’,t’) frame stea-
dily increases, the x’ and t’ axes rotate uniformly toward the 
light cone in order to preserve the invariance of the speed of 
light for both frames. (Of course, the proprietors of the (x’, 
4 - R. Sigal and A. Shamaly (1974, p. 2358) state, ‘we use the term tachyon to describe any propagation outside the light cone,’ and this could include both of what 
I have called superluminal effects and influences. Sigal and Shamaly’s usage is not unusual in the literature; however, I will in this paper follow my narrower 
usage of ‘tachyon’ because the three-fold distinction I sketch between different types of superluminal propagations allows me to make certain claims with less risk 
of misunderstanding.
Figure 1
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t’) frame are perfectly entitled to draw their axes as orthogo-
nal and the axes of the lab frame as rotating away from the 
light cone.) Recall that the spatial hyperplanes of a Lorentz 
frame serve as its hyperplanes of simultaneity when simul-
taneity is defined according to Einstein’s clock synchroniza-
tion convention (see Taylor and Wheeler 1966). Any string of 
events along a line parallel to the x-axis of S is simultaneous 
in S, though not in any frame moving with respect to S. As 
the x’-axis rotates toward the light cone, there will be exactly 
one relative velocity between lab and moving frames at which 
the spatial axis of the moving frame coincides with OE, and 
just as Maxwell says, in this frame and this frame only the 
propagation along OE will be instantaneous (though it is 
superluminal in all frames). Indeed, if u is the velocity of a 
superluminal propagation with respect to the lab frame, then 
this propagation moves infinitely fast not in a frame ‘truly at 
rest’ as Dainton has it, but in a frame moving with velocity 
v = c2/u with respect to the lab frame.5
There are thus two salient facts about instantaneity in special 
relativity:  first, instantaneity with respect to a frame of refe-
rence is a perfectly admissible concept; second, there is no 
invariant concept of instantaneity if ‘instantaneous’ means 
‘traversing a distance with no lapse of coordinate time’. (The 
frame-dependence of instantaneity is merely the relativity 
of time-coordinate simultaneity in different words.)  There 
is no question that the frame-dependence of infinite velocity 
clashes with Newtonian intuitions that are hard to dislodge. 
However, because instantaneity (or equivalently infinite velo-
city) is a frame-dependent concept, there is no way that any 
form of superluminal propagation (even though it is neces-
sarily infinitely fast in some frame, as shown in Fig. 1) could 
define an absolute rest frame, a notion that cannot even be 
represented in the mathematics of special relativity (let alone 
on a spacetime diagram).
Another way to look at it is to note that any ordinary object 
moving at some velocity less than the speed of light defines a 
special frame as well, namely its local co-moving rest frame. 
No one supposes that the fact that every subluminal object is 
at rest in its own private inertial frame picks out a ‘privileged’ 
frame whose existence threatens the Principle of Relativity. 
The local co-moving frame of a subluminal particle is deter-
mined by the contingent details of that particle’s history, 
and is not by itself a universal law of physics. Similarly, no 
one need suppose that if there is so much as one instance of 
superluminal propagation in the universe then its existence 
would pose a threat to the Principle of Relativity just because 
its motion is instantaneous in a particular frame of reference. 
Again—any such frame of instantaneity would be picked out 
not as a matter of universal law but as a consequence of the 
accidents of the dynamical history which led to that particu-
lar propagation. 
It is essential to grasp that while the Principle of Relativity 
requires that there be a covariant description of every pos-
sible physical process, it does not imply that everything looks 
the same in every admissible state of motion.6 As noted, any 
discrete object is at rest only in its own local co-moving rest 
frame. Another pertinent example is the electromagnetic 
field; it has a covariant description (see, e. g., Misner, Thorne, 
and Wheeler 1973, §3.4) but this surely does not mean that 
any given electromagnetic field looks the same in all states 
of motion.  For example, the field of a point charge in its own 
rest frame has no non-zero magnetic components, but this 
hardly implies that the rest frame of a charge is ‘privileged’ 
(even though when doing electromagnetic theory it is often 
useful to simplify a problem by finding a frame, if one can, in 
which some components of the field vanish). Similarly, pace 
Maxwell, the fact that any superluminal influence is infinitely 
fast in one but only one frame does not contradict the Prin-
ciple of Relativity.
There is a subtle fact about relative velocities that is not 
always explicitly mentioned in books on relativity, and a fai-
lure to grasp this subtle fact may be a cause of some of the 
confusion about superluminal motion. In special relativity all 
velocities (except for the velocity of light itself) are relative, 
including zero and infinite velocity. However, it is an inva-
riant fact whether or not two physical systems have a certain 
relative velocity.  Thus it would be an invariant fact whe-
ther or not a certain tachyon beam is instantaneous relative 
to a certain inertial frame. Perhaps this is part of what has 
puzzled those who apparently believe that the mere existence 
of superluminality would imply the existence of an invariant 
or ‘absolute’ state of motion other than the motion of light 
itself.  Dainton et al. possibly have confused the invariant 
fact that any superluminal propagation has infinite velocity 
relative to one frame (which one depends on the spacetime 
trajectory of the superluminal effect) with the notion (not 
correct) that any superluminal propagation would be inva-
riantly infinite for all frames.
When Dainton speaks of ‘truly’ instantaneous connections 
his usage is ambiguous.  No connection outside the light cone 
is instantaneous in more than one physical frame although 
in that frame it is ‘truly’ instantaneous. Which frame it is de-
pends upon initial conditions and is not some law of nature. 
And since any instantaneous connection is superluminal 
in all frames the question of instantaneity is a red herring; 
the real question is what we are to make of superluminal in-
fluences.
Let’s go back to Cabello’s worries about Bell correlations. 
There is no question that if they are due to any sort of causal 
influence it must be superluminal, and if it is superluminal 
in one frame it is superluminal in all. However, that hardly 
implies that such superluminal influences would be instan-
5 -  This follows from the Lorentz transformation for time:  implies .  See Rindler (1979), especially pp. 90-91.
6 -  What I say here does not add much to the very clear argument given by F. A. Muller (1992). 
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taneous in any given frame.  In which frames they happen to 
be instantaneous would depend upon the initial and boun-
dary conditions of the experiment. Thus, there certainly is a 
theory that allows for influences which are instantaneous in 
one frame and finite (though superluminal) in all others: it is 
called ‘special relativity.’
3 – Superluminal influences 
would not allow detection of 
absolute motion
In order to address TS3, let’s consider a slightly more com-
plicated scenario. In Fig. 2, Alice and Bob are localized ob-
servers moving through spacetime. They were initially coin-
cident at O and at that point they synchronized their local 
co-moving standard clocks.  As the diagram suggests, they 
undergo varying accelerations in their careers through spa-
cetime.  If they are brought back into coincidence at a much 
later point it will be found that in general their elapsed pro-
per times (given by the readings on their co-moving clocks) 
will differ. This is the much-debated Twin Paradox, which is 
based on the fact that elapsed proper time is path-dependent 
but invariant while coordinate time (as defined by Einstein’s 
clock synchronization convention) is global but frame-de-
pendent. (See Marder 1971, Arthur 2008, and H. R. Brown’s 
lucid discussion of clocks as the `waywisers’ of spacetime, in 
Brown 2006, p. 95.)
Suppose that Alice emits a tachyon beam at A which moves 
with constant superluminal velocity until it happens to inter-
sect Bob’s worldline at his world point B.  I say ‘happens to’ 
since I’m not appealing here to any speculative theory that 
would give rules governing the motion of tachyons; for all 
we know, Alice’s tachyon beam could have been emitted in a 
random direction in spacetime and the fact that it intersects 
Bob’s worldline at B could be pure chance. Nevertheless, it is 
invariant that the beam intersects Alice’s worldline at A and 
Bob’s at B and that it follows a certain trajectory through spa-
cetime between these world points. The ordering of A and B 
with respect to a global time coordinate is frame-dependent, 
but the fact that these points are connected by the tachyon 
beam is not.
If Alice and Bob happen to be (even momentarily) at rest with 
respect to each other at the points A and B, then they share 
a common inertial frame, which can be defined so that the 
line AB is its spatial x-axis.  The tachyon connecting A and B 
will be instantaneous in this frame (and, strictly speaking, in 
any frame related to it by mere translation). This, at the risk 
of repetition, is certainly an invariant fact. But if Alice and 
Bob are linked by a tachyon beam which is instantaneous in 
their mutual rest frame, that does not in the slightest degree 
imply that Alice and Bob are ‘absolutely’ at rest, as Lucas and 
Dainton seem to think. The invariance of a state of relative 
rest does not imply the existence of a globally invariant state 
of rest any more than does the invariance of the fact that Alice 
and Bob could be moving at some non-zero finite velocity  v 
with respect to each other imply that v  is an absolute velocity 
in any sense that would have interested Newton.  Again, the 
mere fact that Alice and Bob might be connected by a tachyon 
beam---or for that matter a string of flashbulbs which hap-
pen to have been arranged so as to pop off simultaneously 
in Alice and Bob’s mutual rest frame because kinematically 
these things are equivalent—surely does not by itself imply 
that they are at rest in any ‘absolute’ sense. This is despite the 
fact that it could be an invariant fact that they are relatively 
at rest.
Now, what about detectability?  Let us imagine what some 
might say would be the worst case scenario, which would 
be that Alice can ‘ping’ Bob by means of a readable tachyon 
signal along AB and Bob can bounce a readable response 
back to Alice along BA with no lapse of proper time for her7 
between transmission and reception, and with a complete 
picture of Bob’s local physical state at B encoded in the return 
signal to Alice. The tachyon probe would make it as if Alice at 
A could be momentarily coincident with Bob at B. Alice can 
therefore learn exactly as much but no more from the tachyon 
signal than she could if she and Bob’s worldlines happen to 
cross at A and B. Even with this much information about Bob, 
the very most that Alice could know about Bob’s velocity at B 
is his relative velocity with respect to her at A. Why? Because 
7 -  I have not said anything about the elapsed proper time for the tachyon between A and B.  On the orthodox reading of special relativity, proper time for spacelike 
propagations is imaginary since  outside the light cone.  However, in the superluminal kinematics developed by Sutherland and Shepanski (1986)  
for all intervals, spacelike and otherwise. It is beyond the scope of this paper to adjudicate between their view and the orthodox view. How we parameterize proper 
time along the tachyon’s path is not relevant to our discussion here.  
Figure 2
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that is all the information about Bob’s state of motion there 
is to be had—Bob doesn’t have an absolute velocity. Alice can 
use the tachyon beam to determine the invariant fact of her 
relative velocity with respect to Bob, but if she understands 
relativity theory she will not be confused by the fact that it is 
invariant whether she and Bob are relatively at rest at certain 
points.
Indeed, Alice need not have used tachyon beams at all to 
know her state of motion with respect to Bob’s at A and B, 
for she and Bob (when they were coincident at O) could have 
arranged in advance that they would follow acceleration 
schedules such that they would be relatively at rest at points 
A and B.  No one would dream of suggesting that the fact that 
they could do this would define an absolute state of rest that 
would violate the Principle of Relativity.  There is no good 
reason at all to suppose that the mere fact that Alice and Bob 
can somehow infer that they are mutually at rest at some spa-
cetime points or others implies the existence of an absolute or 
invariant state of rest, and this fact is independent of whether 
they are connected by a tachyon that happens to be instan-
taneous in their mutual rest frame, whether the ‘connection 
has some detectable effects,’ or whether Alice at A and Bob at 
B have any way at all of measuring directly or inferring each 
other’s states of motion.
There’s another way of looking at it.  Suppose the point O 
is at rest in the ‘lab’ frame, and suppose as before that Alice 
and Bob are momentarily at rest with respect to each other at 
points A and B. At those points they could be moving at any 
velocity from zero to arbitrarily close to but not equal to c 
with respect to the lab frame.  There are therefore indefinitely 
many velocities with respect to the lab frame at which Alice 
and Bob could be at rest with respect to each other.  Hence 
the fact that they can be at rest with respect to each other can 
hardly define a unique state of rest, which would surely have 
to be unique if it were indeed ‘absolute.’ Again, this is com-
pletely independent of whether or not Alice or Bob could use 
tachyons or any other means to tell that they were relatively 
at rest at A and B.
These observations help to explicate a remark made by Arnt-
zenius (1990, pp. 229-230):
When W. Salmon [claims] that tachyons, if they could be used as 
signals, could establish absolute simultaneity, he does not indi-
cate how one could do this.  Assuming the frame-independence 
of the speed of light, and the frame dependence of the speed of 
tachyons this in fact appears to be a hopeless project:  which ta-
chyons exactly are to be used to establish absolute simultaneity?
What I am mostly doing here in my response to TS3 is to spell 
out in almost painful detail this point made by Arntzenius in 
1990.8 With apologies to Arntzenius, it seems that this point 
needs to be made again, with as much clarity as can be mus-
tered. Again, if I may: Any tachyon is instantaneous with res-
pect to some frame and there is no basis on which to pick one 
tachyon as definitive of an invariant state of rest. Conversely, 
for any inertial frame there is a trajectory which is instan-
taneous in that frame; which of the indefinitely many such 
frames do we pick as privileged?
4 – Superluminal influences 
would not conflict with Eins-
tein’s relativity of simultaneity
It should be clear that TS1-3 can be obviated by a bit of care-
ful thought about how spacetime diagrams work. But now 
we must say something about Dainton’s worry (TS4) about 
distant clock synchronization, which raises much more inte-
resting difficulties—and possibilities. Precisely what can Alice 
and Bob do with tachyons that they cannot do with light si-
gnals?
First, if a readable signal, per impossibile perhaps, could be 
imposed on a tachyon beam, then Alice and Bob could mo-
mentarily synchronize their local clocks at the points A and B. 
What I mean is that if Alice can send her local clock reading 
at point A to Bob at point B then Bob could set his local clock 
reading at B to agree with Alice’s local reading at A. Our New-
tonian intuitions prompt us to think that the distant clocks 
are synchronized only if they have the same reading at the 
same global time coordinate.  However, this has no invariant 
meaning in special relativity, whereas it is invariant whe-
ther the local readings at A and B are equalized as described. 
Whether or not the local clock readings are equal at A and B 
is therefore independent of whether or not A and B are at the 
same global time coordinate in some inertial frame or other.
Distant clocks in special relativity can be synchronized using 
light signals but it takes a certain minimum amount of time 
to do that in every frame.  The new thing that Bob and Alice 
could do with controllable tachyons is synchronize their dis-
tant clocks so that there exists an inertial frame in which the 
process takes no time.  It could be done by picking the frame 
in which AB is a spatial axis connecting Bob and Alice. The 
events A and B are at the same time in this frame and the 
tachyon signal will be instantaneous in this frame.  But whe-
ther or not the clocks at A and B are synchronized by tachyons 
interchanged between A and B is completely unaffected by 
any choice of inertial frame in which the process is described.
8 - Arntzenius’ paper ‘Causal Paradoxes in Special Relativity’ (1990) is still an essential prerequisite for anyone who wishes to investigate the puzzles arising from 
the possibility of causal looping in special relativity.  Where we can go beyond Arntzenius today is that more is known about entanglement and extended versions 
of quantum mechanics such as the two-state formalism; these topics, which open the door to decidedly non-classical notions of causation, are discussed briefly in 
later sections of the present paper.  
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I said that Alice and Bob could synchronize their clocks 
‘momentarily’ because unless they happen to remain at rest 
with respect to each other their local clocks would get out of 
synchrony again as they continue their careers through spa-
cetime. On the other hand, if Alice and Bob continue to stay 
at rest with respect to each other then their clocks, once syn-
chronized by tachyons at A and B, would stay in synchrony.
The crucial point of this story is that Alice and Bob’s ability 
to synchronize their clocks using tachyons would not violate 
the relativity of simultaneity defined as equality of a global 
time coordinate, because the latter is based upon Einstein’s 
considerations about how one could synchronize clocks using 
light rays given that the speed of light is both finite and inva-
riant. Einstein’s way of defining time-coordinate simultaneity 
neither assumes nor requires that light signals be either the 
fastest or the only way of communicating between distant 
events; it’s only about what can be accomplished with light 
signals.9 Alice and Bob could have tachyon-based radios and 
yet still go ahead and set up a coordinate system using ordi-
nary laser beams and Einstein’s synchronization procedures 
(as in, e. g., Wheeler and Taylor 1966), and all the strictures 
identified by Einstein would continue to apply to the latter. 
The possibility of tachyon signals makes no difference to the 
relativity of time-coordinate simultaneity, for it simply would 
give another way of coordinating distant events than by 
means of electromagnetic signals.  This point was made by G. 
Nerlich quite some time ago (1982) but it seems that it must 
be made again.
Thus Salmon’s statement that ‘the relativity of simultaneity... 
hinges crucially upon the existence of a finite upper speed li-
mit on the propagation of causal processes and signals’ (1980, 
p. 122) is simply incorrect.  The relativity of time-coordinate 
simultaneity (where times are defined using the synchroni-
zation procedure recommended by Einstein in 1905), and 
indeed the entire mathematical structure of special relativity, 
is dependent upon the assumption that the vacuum speed 
of light is a finite invariant, not necessarily a maximum. It 
seems clear that Einstein himself believed that c is a universal 
speed limit, and it is also clear that many authors would pre-
fer that this were the case,10 but that assumption is not ma-
thematically required in order to derive the Lorentz transfor-
mations.  To confirm this, review Einstein’s own derivation of 
the transformations (1905), or see any standard presentation 
of special relativity (e.g., Wheeler and Taylor 1966).
If there are, indeed, superluminal influences or connections 
of some sort, then there is no good reason to think that they 
could not peacefully coexist in parallel with Einstein’s time-
coordinate simultaneity.11
5 – But superluminal in-
fluences might allow alterna-
tive concepts of simultaneity
What would superluminal influences, controllable or othe-
rwise, add to our understanding of simultaneity?  Is there any 
sense in speaking of superluminal influences as definitive of 
simultaneity-like relations on spacelike-separate events?
The problem is that even though everyone knows that simul-
taneity defined in terms of global a time coordinate is frame-
dependent, almost everyone still wants time-coordinate 
simultaneity to do the same metaphysical work that abso-
lute-time simultaneity does in Newton’s universe.  Newton’s 
absolute time is the great steady heartbeat of his universe, 
and all physical changes in that universe are with respect to 
it.  In Einstein’s universe there are indefinitely many ways 
of coordinatizing events; none are metaphysically privileged 
though some may be preferable for practical reasons. Eins-
tein’s procedure for setting up space and time coordinates 
using light signals and standard measuring rods is, to be sure, 
very useful (in large part because it nicely reduces to the New-
tonian picture in the limit of low relative velocities), but it is 
only one possible way of painting coordinates onto events; 
general covariance tells us that no coordinatization of events 
is privileged in any physical or metaphysical sense (Rovelli 
2004).12 It is therefore not automatically given that any phy-
sical connectivity or equivalence between spacelike sepa-
rate events must be described in reference to hyperplanes of 
9  - The persistent belief that relativity is based upon the assumption that light is a ‘first signal’ (as in Reichenbach, 1957) is arguably an instance of what John 
Woods (2003, p. 153) has described as the Heuristic Fallacy:
Let H be a body of heuristics with respect to the construction of  some theory T.  Then if P is a belief from H, which is  indispensable to the construction of T, 
then the inference that  T is incomplete unless it sanctions the derivation of P is a fallacy.
(Woods goes on (p. 154)  to explain diplomatically that many fallacies are errors ‘that even the attentive and intelligent are routinely disposed to make.’) While the 
notion that c is a limiting velocity certainly played a key historical role in motivating the construction of special relativity by Einstein and Poincaré, this notion is 
not formally used as a premise of the theory, and it is only debatably a theorem of special relativity. 
10  - An important example is J. S. Bell, who said that by his theorem ‘maybe there must be something happening faster than light, although it pains me even to say 
that much’ [emphasis added] (Mann and Crease 1988, p. 90).
11 - In this paper I have entirely skirted the large and subtle literature on the conventionality of simultaneity, because that problem is about what can be accom-
plished with light signals—an important question that is orthogonal to my interest here, which is to explore what could be accomplished with other sorts of signals 
than light. For an up-to-date review of the conventionality of simultaneity, see (Brown 2006, pp. 95-105).
12 - In many relativistic cosmologies, such as Robertson-Walker universes, there can be a global time, but it is history-dependent and does not conflict with general 
covariance. See, e.g., (Weinberg 2008). 
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constant time coordinate.
This, by the way, is the blind spot that has dogged discussions 
of the problem of finding a covariant description of quantum 
state reduction. Even the best-informed authors in this litera-
ture (e.g., Aharonov and Albert 1980, 1981) assume that wave 
function collapse has to occur over hypersurfaces of constant 
time coordinate, which leads to the immediate conclusion 
that there is no covariant description of the process, if it is a 
physical process at all.13 If one were to seek a covariant des-
cription of state reduction, one would want to see if this can 
be done in terms of covariant properties of the wave func-
tion.14 An obvious candidate is phase:  it is far more natural 
to think of wave functions as reducing over hypersurfaces 
of constant phase, and this automatically gives a covariant 
picture; given appropriate initial conditions, it may also be 
possible to describe state reduction in terms of constant ac-
tion (Rietdijk 1985; Peacock 2006). These proposals require 
much technical development but, from the spacetime point 
of view advocated in this paper, the conventional assumption 
that state reduction is linked to hypersurfaces of constant 
time coordinate seems to be among the least promising ap-
proaches to the problem.
Returning to the problem of simultaneity, consider Fig. 2, 
and again suppose there is some sort of connection or in-
fluence outside the light cone between points A and B. This 
would most likely be quantum mechanical in its basis, but to 
see the point I want to make we need not worry about the pre-
cise nature or origin of this connection; whether or not there 
are such influences or connections is an empirical question 
which cannot be settled on an a priori basis from the postu-
lates of special relativity as they presently stand.  Whatever 
the details of the dynamics may be, the kinematics of such 
connections is clear in the following respect:  the connection 
between A and B is factual in the sense that all observers in 
all states of motion will agree that it is those two points, A 
and B, which are connected in this particular way; the fact 
that these points are connected is relativistically invariant. 
As we have seen, A and B will be at the same time in one and 
only one frame, which (again) is ‘distinguished’ only by its 
dynamical history and not by some law of nature. In all other 
frames A and B will be at different time coordinates, and so 
whether or not two spacetime events are connected in this 
peculiar invariant but history-dependent way has nothing to 
do with whether or not they are at the same time in some 
Lorentz frame.
I would now like to suggest that if such connections do exist 
it is meaningful to say that they define a kind of simultaneity 
relation between A and B—though obviously not the sort of 
simultaneity defined by Einstein, which is based on equality 
of a global time coordinate.  A full treatment of this question 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but I’ll try to say enough to 
show where this inquiry could go.
The key is that the modern usage of the term ‘simultaneity’ 
equivocates on two distinct senses of the term.  According to 
Max Jammer (2006, p. 11), the etymological root of ‘simul-
taneity’ 
is, of course, the Latin “simul,’’ which in turn derives from the 
Sanskrit “sem’’ (or “sema’’), meaning “together,’’ both in the 
sense “together in space’’ and “together in time’’.
The Oxford Latin Dictionary (Souter et al. 1968) tells us that 
the Latin simul has two distinct senses: two events may be 
simul if they occur at the same time, but events may also be 
judged simul if they are in some way together or in joint pro-
cess—that is, part of some larger or more extensive coherent 
whole. Our events A and B are simul in the second sense in all 
frames of reference, but simul in the first sense in only one. 
The notion of simultaneity as joint process is an epistemically 
more primitive sense of simultaneity than simultaneity in 
terms of time coordinate, since judgements of time are built 
up from judgements of coincidence (localized joint process) 
between clock readings and localized events. In a Newtonian 
universe it is natural to assume that events in joint process 
are at the same absolute time, but this does not follow in an 
Einsteinian universe.15
13 - According to Aharonov and Albert (1980, p. 3322),
[i]n the nonrelativistic case a measurement is taken to set initial conditions for the propagator over the equal-time hypersurface of the measurement event... 
In the relativistic case, however, different observers will in general have different definitions of this hypersurface... different observers may derive different 
sets of probabilities.
They go on to explain that there is, after all, a consistent way of predicting the probabilities of local measurement results, with the aid of microcausality, but ‘a 
description of the physical system in terms of its observables simply cannot consistently be written down’ (1980, p. 3324).  But if state reduction is superluminal, 
which it must be, then for the elementary kinematic reasons explained in this paper there is only one frame in which it could reset probabilities over an equal-time 
hypersurface. Therefore, it is just a mistake to suppose that every observer would describe the reduction process as instantaneous.
14 - It is important ton say what sort of wave function we are discussing when we talk of the problem of finding a covariant description of wave function collapse. 
The wave function is not necessarily an object living in configuration space.  A wave function in general is simply the projection of the state function into a 
continuous representative (see Cohen-Tannoudji, Diu, and Laloë 1977, Ch. II, §E) which could be configuration space, ordinary spacetime, or momentum-energy 
space. What I am talking about here, and what most of this literature concerns itself with, is the de Broglie wave packet, which is a projection of the state function 
into Minkowski space; see (Dirac 1958, §30) for a succinct review of the de Broglie wave.
15 - A small number of authors have explored the notion that there are distinct senses of simultaneity.  Adolph Grünbaum (1973, p. 203) defined what he called 
topological simultaneity:  events simultaneous in this sense are those that cannot be connected causally.  Since he thought that any sort of spacelike causal 
connections are excluded by relativity theory, all events spacelike separate from A are topologically simultaneous with respect to it. Whether or not events are 
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In orthodox relativity the notion of invariant joint process is 
accepted so long as the events are coincident.  In Einstein’s 
words (1916, p. 115), 
We assume the possibility of verifying ‘simultaneity’ for events 
immediately proximate in space, or—to speak more precisely—
for immediate proximity or coincidence in space-time, without 
giving a definition of this fundamental concept.
But even in his earliest writings on the theory of relativity 
Einstein was well aware that the notion of the coincidence of 
two presumably point-like events is neither mathematically 
nor physically clear: 
We shall not here discuss the inexactitude which lurks in the 
concept of simultaneity of two events at approximately the same 
place, which can only be removed by an abstraction (1905, p. 39).
Up to now I have been largely concerned with pointing out 
the respects in which superluminal influences are consistent 
with relativistic kinematics as presently understood.  We 
now reach a boundary beyond which one must consider ways 
in which relativity needs to be expanded to take account of 
quantum mechanics.  Physics can no longer avoid addressing 
the ‘lurking inexactitude’ cited by Einstein.
In classical relativity the ambiguity in the notion of infinitesi-
mal closeness is simply ignored; spacetime is taken to be built 
up out of point-like events and if these are spacelike separate 
they are presumed to be causally disjoint (except insofar as 
they can be linked by backwards and forwards light cones). 
Therefore, from the point of view of quantum mechanics the 
concept of an event in classical relativity is ambiguous in 
two respects. First, the physical meaning of coincidence or 
infinitesimal closeness is unclear.  This is partially because 
of the Uncertainty Relations; also, some current approaches 
to quantum gravity (e.g., Ali, Das, and Vagenas 2009) open 
up the possibility that space and time may be discrete at 
the Planck scale. If spacetime is discrete then even events 
separated by one quantum of length are spacelike separate 
and, by the classical criteria, could not be considered coinci-
dent. Second, and most pertinent to the theme of this paper, 
is the vexing question of whether events outside each other’s 
light cones are causally disjoint. No one doubts that any col-
lection of events can be associated by convention in an es-
sentially arbitrary way; the question is whether it makes any 
sense to speak of distant events as being in ‘joint process’ in 
a causal or dynamical way that is somehow demanded by the 
physics of the situation.
There is increasing evidence that quantum mechanics shows 
that distant particles, especially if they are entangled, may 
be nonseparable or form or partake in a unity in surprising 
ways.  It may therefore be sensible to generalize the concep-
tion of an event to allow for events and states that are ex-
tended throughout spacetime in an invariant way.
A dramatic example of the inseparability of spatially extended 
quantum states appears in a recent experiment by K. C. Lee 
et al. (2011).  These experimenters used a complicated in-
terferometric apparatus in which two 3 mm diamond chips 
separated by 30 cm were put into entangled phonon states 
(phonons are quanta of vibrations) and then ‘pinged’ by an 
ultra-high frequency laser. The key point for our discussion 
here is that the diamond chips were demonstrably put into a 
single quantum state despite their spatial separation.  As Lisa 
Grossman explains (2011), 
[t]o show that the diamonds were truly entangled, the resear-
chers hit them with a second laser pulse just 350 femtoseconds 
after the first.  The second pulse picked up the energy the first 
pulse left behind, and reached the detector as an extra-energetic 
photon.  If the system were classical, the second photon should 
pick up extra energy only half the time—only if it happened to hit 
the diamond where the energy was deposited in the first place. 
But in 200 trillion trials, the team found that the second photon 
picked up extra energy every time.  That means that the energy 
was not localized in one diamond or the other, but that they sha-
red the same vibrational state.
It is as if quantum mechanics simply does not know or care 
that the two diamond chips are 30 cm apart.  Lee et al. do 
not attempt a covariant description of their nonlocal energy 
states but their result is an example of the sort of scenario 
we discuss here: at certain proper times along their world-
lines, the two diamond chips share a certain common energy 
state.  Whatever the detailed spacetime description may be 
(this remains to be worked out) it has to be an invariant fact 
that those points on their world-lines are linked in that par-
ticular invariant and nonseparable manner.  Most important, 
the single nonlocal energy state shared by the two distinct 
diamond chips is demonstrably not reducible to two local 
energy states possessed by the two chips. That’s an important 
part of what it means to say that the state is entangled: it is 
not separable into distinct and localizable sub-states.  To be 
sure, the diamond chips have other physical properties that 
are localizable in the normal way, but their non-separable, 
spatially-extended energy state seems to be a very natural 
candidate for an entity that is simul in the second sense. One 
cannot avoid speaking of it as being in ‘joint process’ because 
topologically simultaneous is an invariant distinction. Brent Mundy (1986) similarly defined what he called causal simultaneity as the absence of any possible causal 
connection, but unlike Grünbaum he argued that relativity does not logically exclude the possibility of spacelike causal connections; therefore, on Mundy’s view, 
the sets of causally simultaneous events might not comprise the whole region outside the light cone.  The synchronization of distant clocks according to Einstein’s 
clock synchronization convention was called by Mundy optical simultaneity. Mundy argued that the presentations of relativity by Grünbaum and Reichenbach 
(1957) are reconstructions, based on the unnecessarily strong assumption that light is a ‘first signal,’ which distort the meaning of the theory and drastically limit 
its scope.
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it cannot even be analyzed into distinct localized parts.
It is quite likely that such alternative notions of simultaneity 
as suggested here—invariant but history-dependent—would 
violate some people’s intuitions about a vaguely-defined 
‘Spirit of Relativity,’ but it is not obvious that they are not 
allowed by the mathematical structure of relativity and they 
seem to be demanded by quantum physics.  While relativity 
is far more amenable to superluminal influences that has 
been generally supposed, ultimately it is classical relativity 
that must adapt itself to the quantum (Chang and Cartwright 
1993; Peacock 1998).
To summarize:  if we grant that there could be invariant 
connections between spacelike separate events, likely quan-
tum mechanical in their basis, then it is reasonable to call it a 
kind of simultaneity relation because it answers to the notion 
of distant events as being part of a single process.  Quantum 
mechanics prima facie demands that we disambiguate the 
two key senses of simultaneity that have been conflated since 
the time of Newton.
6 – Are ‘causal’ accounts of 
quantum mechanics consistent 
with the Principle of Relativity?
An anonymous referee for this paper made a very helpful 
observation:
[T]here are theories that are phenomenologically compatible 
with special relativity  in which superluminal propagation does 
pick out a preferred frame.  Bohmian mechanics (also referred to 
as ‘pilot-wave’ theory or de Broglie-Bohm theory) has a preferred 
frame of reference.  Perhaps theories like these are feeding the 
intuitions of those making claims akin to TS2...
This is quite likely right.  For instance, Maudlin (2002) ar-
gues that Bell’s Theorem could force us to concede that there 
is a special frame which is preferred although undetectably 
so. Thus one must ask whether any theory that attempts to 
underpin quantum statistics by means of nonlocal dynamics 
is necessarily in conflict with Lorentz invariance.  Or to turn 
the question around, can there be a covariant theory of non-
local dynamics?
Bohm’s ‘hidden variable’ theory of 1952 (Bohm 1952; Cushing 
1994) is Galilean-invariant because Bohm never intended 
it to be otherwise; his aim was to show that non-relativistic 
wave mechanics could be underpinned by a causal (though 
unavoidably superluminal) dynamics in which particles ap-
parently have definite trajectories.  Hence it is reasonable to 
investigate whether a relativistic generalization of Bohm’s 
theory is possible.  Bohm himself apparently thought not: he 
and Basil Hiley state that ‘it would be extremely surprising 
to obtain a Lorentz invariant theory of particles that were 
connected nonlocally’ (Bohm and Hiley 1993, p. 282).  They 
consider two spacelike separate particles A and B, ‘both at 
rest in the laboratory frame’ at worldpoints a and b respecti-
vely, and then remark,
[i]f there is a nonlocal connection of the kind implied by our gui-
dance condition, then it follows that, for example, points a and 
b instantaneously affect each other.  But if the theory is cova-
riant, there should be similar instantaneous connections in every 
Lorentz frame.
Their accompanying figure shows connections from a to other 
points on B’s worldline. Although their language is unclear, 
Bohm and Hiley do seem to grasp that each possible spacelike 
connection between a and the points along the worldline of B 
would be instantaneous in one and only one Lorentz frame; 
there is no covariant sense in which all are instantaneous. 
However, they go on to say that from the fact that there could 
be instantaneous connections between a and earlier points 
on A’s own worldline via points on B’s worldline, it would 
be possible to set up a typical closed-loop causal paradox in 
which an influence from a could interfere with A’s own his-
tory at an earlier worldpoint along  A’s worldline in such a 
way as to prevent the influence from being emitted at a.
Closed causal loops are a genuine problem for superluminal 
theories, but the risk of a closed causal loop has nothing to 
do with whether or not the connections are instantaneous in 
some frame or other, for that is a frame-dependent concept. 
To this extent, Bohm and Hiley suffer from confusions about 
instantaneity similar to those I have criticized elsewhere in 
this paper. Rather, the risk of closed-loop paradox has to do 
with the invariant fact that points in spacetime can some-
times be connected in a closed loop by means of the pres-
umed superluminal influences; the problem, if any, arises 
from the fact that the influences would be superluminal (and 
thus outside the light cones of both A and B), not that they 
would be instantaneous. So the question that matters is whe-
ther any putative superluminal theories should be rejected 
just because they may open up the possibility of closed causal 
loops.  I’ll return to this point below.
While Bohm’s theory is the best-developed causal alternative 
to conventional quantum mechanics, it is not the only pos-
sible such theory. Late in his life Louis de Broglie was ins-
pired by Bohm to revisit his own early attempts at a causal 
version of quantum mechanics (1960, 1970). De Broglie’s 
late causal theory, though incomplete in many respects (for 
instance, it applies only to spin-0 particles), is fully Lorentz-
covariant. Bohm and Hiley themselves were not comfortable 
with theories like de Broglie’s later approach (see their 1993, 
p. 238) because such theories imply that any particle inte-
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racts via the four-dimensional wave field with other particles 
both past and future throughout spacetime. Bohm and Hiley 
seem to have thought that this was simply too strong a vio-
lation of classical intuitions or expectations about causality. 
This is why they rejected the possibility of  covariant pictures 
of nonlocality (such as de Broglie’s), not because such theo-
ries are technically out of the question.
The need to revise our intuitions about causality could be 
the price to be paid for any causal interpretation of quantum 
mechanics that satisfies the Principle of Relativity.  In parti-
cular, a four-dimensional picture of the wave field could be 
the answer to worries about paradoxical closed causal loops: 
if such loops are mediated by a genuinely covariant quantum 
field then it simply would not be possible to write a descrip-
tion of a self-contradictory loop in the language of the theory, 
any more than any other sort of quantum state vector can 
be validly written in manifestly contradictory terms.  That 
is, while there may well be amplitudes for past-future-past 
loops, each possible amplitude could only be for sequences 
of events (more precisely, measurement outcomes) that are 
mutually consistent. Thus, while such a theory such as de 
Broglie’s would certainly do violence to classical intuitions 
(prejudices?) about the proper order of cause and effect it is 
quite likely that it would not allow for outright logical para-
doxes of the kind that worried Bohm and Hiley.
A similar picture arises in the two-vector formalism studied 
by Aharonov, Popescu and Tollaksen (2010). Their theory 
is not explicitly a causal interpretation of quantum mecha-
nics, but it also considers amplitudes from both the past and 
the future. It could be worthwhile to investigate parallels 
between de Broglie’s Lorentz covariant causal theory and 
the two-vector formalism.  Although there are closed loops 
in the two-vector formalism, there is no risk of paradox for 
the reason outlined above:  no single looped amplitude is, in 
itself, inconsistent.  Like the possible states of Schrödinger’s 
cat, the possible classical outcomes may well be inconsistent 
with each other, but each possible outcome set is internally 
consistent—and only one is ever observed.  In versions of 
quantum mechanics that allow for future-to-past ampli-
tudes, the mystery of causal looping is therefore subsumed 
into the larger mystery of understanding the relation between 
the quantum mechanical descriptions of physics in terms of 
amplitudes and the outcomes that are actually observed. 
These possibilities require much further study, but enough is 
known now to show that one should not automatically reject 
a version of quantum mechanics because it allows for causal 
loops.16
There is a larger question:  Lorentz invariance itself fails to 
satisfy the Principle of Relativity in a certain crucial respect, 
since the Lorentz transformations are divergent at a critical 
velocity (the velocity of light in vacuum). Sutherland and 
Shepanski (1986) point to this as the key factor hindering the 
extension of the principle of relativity to all relative velocities, 
since it makes it impossible to cover all of spacetime, both 
inside and outside the light cone, with a single group of conti-
nuous transformations. It is thus impossible to transform to 
a frame moving with velocity c and this fact arguably violates 
the presumption of the equivalence of all frames. It is concei-
vable that a deeper theory which avoids this problem (pos-
sibly by allowing for quantum effects which would suppress 
the divergence at velocities very close to c) will obey some 
invariance principle more general than Lorentz invariance. 
Let us call such a to-be-written principle Planck covariance. 
Presumably it would would reduce to Lorentz invariance in 
suitable limits just as Lorentz-covariant theories reduce to 
Galilean theories in the limit of low relative velocities.
I have indulged in some reasonably well-founded specula-
tions in this section. However, what is not speculative is that 
(as the example of de Broglie’s theory shows) it is not necessa-
rily the case that any account of quantum mechanics in terms 
of some more general physical principles would demand the 
return to Galilean covariance and a preferred frame; rather, 
the move to a fully quantized theory of relativity will probably 
take us even farther from Galilean covariance than does spe-
cial relativity.
7 – Summary and what must 
lie ahead
A lot more needs to be said before anyone has any business 
being entirely comfortable with the notion of superluminal 
influences, quantum mechanical or otherwise.17 But a neces-
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16 - There is a large literature exploring the puzzle of closed causal loops that could arise given the possibility of time travel or backwards causation (not necessarily 
in the context of quantum mechanics).  Some notable papers in this genre include Arntzenius (1990), Brown (1992), and Smith (1997).  The upshot of these investi-
gations is that it is by no means obvious that a physical theory should be automatically excluded because it allows for the possibility of causal looping.
17 - Further problems with superluminality include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
• The temporal order of spacelike separate events is frame-dependent; this may require the abandonment of causal order as a global invariant.
• With some combinations of relative velocities, superluminal trajectories can form closed causal loops, apparently allowing for logical paradoxes.
• Rest mass diverges at v = c, apparently precluding the acceleration of massive bodies through the speed of light.
• There are problems with reconciling superluminal motion with local quantum field theory as it is presently understood.
• In some but not all versions of superluminal or ‘extended’ relativity proper quantities are imaginary.
• It is widely though controversially held that quantum mechanical entanglement cannot be exploited for controllable superluminal signalling.  (For the 
orthodox view of quantum signalling, see, e.g., Eberhard and Ross (1989) and Shimony (1983). For critical responses to this orthodoxy, see Peacock (1992, 
Kennedy (1995), and Mittelstaedt (1998).)
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sary prerequisite to the analysis of any of the substantial pro-
blems with superluminality is to grasp the kinematics of pro-
pagation outside the light cone.
The following points are elementary even though they have 
been persistently misunderstood by professionals working in 
this field: 
• Trajectories outside the light cone have a natural des-
cription in the kinematics of special relativity.
• Infinite velocity (equivalently, instantaneity) is a 
frame-dependent concept, and thus any form of super-
luminal propagation is instantaneous in one and only 
one frame.
• The mere existence of some form of superluminal pro-
pagation, even if it is controllable, does not imply the 
existence, much less the detectability, of any supposi-
tious absolute state of motion.
It is perhaps less immediately obvious, but still clear enough, 
that the possibility of distant clock synchronization via 
superluminal influences does not invalidate the frame-de-
pendence of time-coordinate simultaneity—because the lat-
ter is simply not about what one could do with superluminal 
signals.  And finally it is arguable, though not conclusively 
at this stage, that the increasing evidence of dynamic inse-
parability in a wide variety of quantum mechanical experi-
ments (such as the recent dramatic results by Lee et al. 2011) 
points to the cogency of notions of invariant simultaneity-like 
relations between spacelike separate entities (or portions of 
entities) that are much in the spirit of the ancient notion of 
simultaneity as a kind of jointness, wholeness, or coherence 
of possibly spatially-extensive events.  The task remaining is 
to articulate these possibilities in a precise and testable way.
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